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The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code
Should Not Be Adopted In Ohio
FR mcicK K. BEuTEL*
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code' is being considered
for adoption, among others, in the State of Ohio. The purpose of
this article is to point out as briefly as possible a few of the reasons
why it would be a mistake for the legislature of Ohio, or any other
state for that matter, to adopt this Code.
It is impossible in an article of this scope even to begin to state
all of the defects in a code the size of this one. It would take a
treatise of monumental proportions to explain its effect on the law
and the changes which it seems to contemplate. However, in the
brief space available here, an attempt will be made to point out
some of the major reasons why this Code should not be adopted.
They are approximately as follows:
The subject matter covered by the Code is exceedingly broad
embracing within its terms the heart of what are now the success-
ful Uniform Commercial Statutes. It is, therefore, too large a pro-
ject to be dealt with experimentally.
The process by which it was created was not one calculated
to reach a fair or expert balancing of the conflicting interests sought
to be resolved by the commercial law.
Article 4 on Bank Collections is such a vicious piece of class
legislation that it discredits the process by which the entire Code
was created.
The peculiar vocabulary and erratic use of language would be
certain to cause trouble if this draft were enacted.
Because it lacks unity, its adoption would be certain to create
extensive confusion in a field which is now governed by establish-
ed uniform statutes.
Article 9 on Secured Transactions represents a radical depar-
ture from any known system of law and is too experimental to be
included at this time in a code for uniform adoption.
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. Author of BE=UEs's BRANwAr,
NmOrLU INsmuxWz s LAw (1948), Umrom COmx CIL LAWS (1950), BAmx
OMcERs' EADBOOK or CoM, aM, BANKNG LAw (1939), and numerous articles
on Commercial Law.1 Official Draft, Text and Comments published jointly by American Law
Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1952). Hereinafter called the Code. It will be referred to in the notes by
section number or as Code p.-. In order to save space, portions of the
code discussed have only rarely been reprinted, but are cited in each instance
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The entire Code should be returned to the Institue for unifi-
cation, correction of obvious defects in draftsmanship, and for fur-
ther studies on the unique problems which it will create.
TnE ScoPE OF THE CODE
As indicated elsewhere2 this is one of the most ambitious pro-
jects of codification ever attempted in the United States. The Code
by its own provisions3 is intended to repeal and replace seven cur-
rent Uniform Laws and a number of widely adopted non-uniform
statutes. The Uniform Laws to be repealed are the Negotiable In-
struments Law, the Warehouse Receipts Act, the Stock Transfer
Act, the Sales Act, the Bills of Lading Act, the Trusts Receipt Act,
and the Conditional Sales Act. The first three of these have been
adopted in every state in the union and in most of the territories.4
The Bills of Lading Act has been enacted, with variations, by the
Federal government 5 and by thirty-two states and territories;6 the
Sales Act in thirty-seven, 7 the Trusts Receipts Act by twenty-
seven,8 and the Conditional Sales Act by twelve.9 But the latter
has counterparts in numerous statutes adopted in those states which
have not seen fit to take on the Uniform Act. All of these Uniform
Laws have been adopted in Ohio' 0 except the Trusts Receipts and
the Conditional Sales Acts; and the Ohio statutes have provisions
similar to and covering a broader field than the latter."
The non-uniform but widely adopted statutes which this Code
also intends to repeal include, among others, the American Bank-
er's Association Bank Collections Code adopted in twenty or more
states,-1 the Bulk Transfer Laws which appear in the statutes of
almost all jurisdictions in slightly varying forms, and numerous
statutes having to do with the rights of creditors and the relation-
ships of banks to their depositors. The Ohio legislature, as will be
seen later, has wisely refused to adopt the Bank Collections Code
but has adopted many of the other statutes, including a good Bulk
Sales Act.' 3
2 Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codifi-
cation, 16 LAW & CoiMAn. PROB. 140 (1951); id., The Proposed Uniform [?]
Commercial Code Should Not be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952).
3 § 10-102.
4 See 5 Uwormo LAws Amq. 6 (1950 Supp.); 3 id. at 6; 6 id. at 6.
S 39 STAT. 538 (1916); 48 U.S.C. ch. 4 § 81 et seq. (1948).
6 4 Usi-oue LAws Asy. 6 (1950 Supp.).
7 1 UNiFonx LAws AN. 6 (1950 Supp.).
8 9A UNFoimi LAws AwN,. 274 (1951).
9 2 UNiFoR.I LAWS AN. 6 (1950 Supp.).
10 OHo GEN. CODE §§ 8106 ff., §§ 8457-8509, 13117-13124; § 8673-1 ff., § 8381
ff.; § 8993-1 ff.
1 Id., § § 8560-8572.
1 2 See BErTEL'S BRA= , NESOTABLE ImSmum im LAW (7th ed. 1948) 133.
13 Oo Gmi. CODE § 11102 ff.
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The first question that arises is whether it is sound policy for
Ohio to repeal five major and almost unanimously adopted Uni-
form Laws and a host of lesser statutes intended to be replaced
by this one Code. As indicated in detail elsewhere 4 sixty-three
per cent of the Code by volume is a re-enactment (with a few ad-
ditions of subject matter but in almost entirely new language) of
the five major Uniform Laws which have already been adopted in
Ohio. Articles 6 and 9, Bulk Sales and Security Transactions, con-
stitute about eighteen per cent of the Code by volume and cover
material similar to that found in Ohio in the Bulk Sales Law, the
Chattel Mortgage, and Conditional Sales Acts. But as indicated be-
low, the latter rules of law would be radically altered by the Code.
Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections which constitutes
about nine per cent of the code, luckily for Ohio, as will be indi-
cated later, has no counterpart in the laws of this state. Article 5,
Documentary Letters of Credit, is new. The rest of the Code is
made up of general definitions and other miscellaneous provisions.
In fact over twenty per cent of the entire volume is scope notes
and definitions, a defect which will be discussed in detail later. So
over eighty per cent of the proposed Code is a restatement of Ohio
statutes, the largest part of which are Uniform Laws now uni-
formly enacted throughout the entire United States.
Thus it will be seen that the Code as a whole contains little
subject matter that is new. One of the draftsmen has said, "Most
of the Code is merely restatement."'15 These uniform statutes which
it recodifies have been well received by the courts; and although
there has been considerable conflict over some sections, these par-
ticular areas are the exceptions. Even there the meaning of the
statute is now becoming clearer and the tendency to conflict in de-
cisions is dying out. Generally, it can be said that there is now uni-
formity over most of the field. The only question is whether or not
this draft can consolidate and simplify the law, and is so much bet-
ter than the statutes already enacted that it is worth at least fifty
years of legislative and judicial travail and the conflicts and mis-
understandings that are certain to follow to get the new Code en-
acted and as well understood as are the present statutes. After this
is all done, if it can be done, would the result justify the effort?
There is, therefore, no urgent need for adopting it in Ohio or any
place else unless it is a great improvement on the current law. A
detailed examination of its structure and a comparison of Code and
Ohio statutes will show that this is not the case.
14 Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should not be
Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 336 (1952).
Is Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16
LAW & CoTim . PROB. 27, 28 (1951).
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THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE CODE WAS DRAFTED
Advocates of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code point
out that it is a joint product of the American Law Institute and the
Commission on Uniform Laws. In any advocacy of the Code there
usually appear the names of many prominent scholars and lawyers
running into the hundreds who were connected with the Code.16 In
fact there is here the revision of the common argument of guilt by
association. This amounts to excellence by association. The chief
draftsman of the Code also likes to state that it was created by
democratic process and is therefore a fair and useful law. If the
creation is a democratic process, it should have among those re-
sponsible for it a good cross reference of the society whose activities
it intends to regulate. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the or-
ganizations responsible for creating the Code. The American Law
Institute, its chief sponsor, is made up of a group of successful law-
yers, the judges of the courts of appeal of the various state and Fed-
eral judiciary, and a collection of distinguished law professors. The
Commission on Uniform Laws is a committee of the American Bar
Association now entering its sixty-third year. It is made up of ap-
pointees of the governors of the various states usually serving
gratuitously sometimes with part of their expenses appropriated
by the states. 17 It is an open secret that the American Law Institute,
the American Bar Association, and the Commission on Uniform
Laws are controlled by the same group of prominent corporation
lawyers who run the American Bar Association. All of the mem-
bers, of course, are lawyers representing a divergent class of clients.
Since these lawyers are the most successful in the profession, the
preponderant number of them represent corporations, banks, manu-
facturing, big business, creditor classes, and other vested interests.
Conspicious by their absence are the lawyers representing labor,
farmers, debtors, and consumers. Unless it can be argued that the
college professors or judges represent these, it is fair to say that
they had little or no voice in the groups which are responsible for
the Code.
But it is idle to assume that the members of the American Bar,
the Institute, and the Commission on Uniform Laws drafted the
Code. As in the case of the Restatement and, as indicated else-
where,' 8 the actual drafting was done by a small committee of law
college professors, one or two responsible for each separate arti-
cle 9 and under the direction of a chief draftsman, Karl Llewellyn,
16 For such a list see Code p. 3 ff.
17For the early history of this body see BEuTe'S BRa~AN, NEacom A
Isaimnms LAW (7th ed. 1948) Ch. IV.18 Beutel, note 2, supra.
19 The names of the earlier draftsmen who have, in some cases, been re-
placed will be found in the Comments to the first section of each Article in
the May 1949 Draft of the Code.
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also a distinguished college professor. Also, as was the case with
the Restatement,20 there were a group of advisors for each article
who had more or less intimate contact with the draftsmen in their
day to day work.21 Unlike the group of advisors responsible for the
various Restatements of the Common Law, these committees were
chosen not primarily for their knowledge of the subject being codi-
fied, but rather on the basis of proportional representation of the
Commission of Uniform Laws and the ruling committees of the
American Law Institute.22
Most of the greatest authorities in the subject matter of the
Code are conspicuous by their absence from the advisory com-
mittees.23
Like the drafts of the Restatement the Code is an ex cathedra
statement by the professional draftsmen of the law, but not as
shown by the cases. Rather it is what they think the law ought to
be. Unlike the Restatement it was not limited to codifying the ex-
isting decisions. The draftsmen were, so to speak, at large to create
a law to regulate the commercial world. There was little or no im-
partial economic research into the workings of the present laws,
and no limit upon the free rein of the draftsmen to state what the
law ought to be except the impossibility of getting their drafts ap-
proved by the committees, the Institute assembled, and the Com-
missions on Uniform Laws. This process involved submitting the
draft to the vote of the committees and then to the Institute and the
Commissioners, but usually on very short notice, where a fully
prepared draftsman debated against unprepared members who had
little time to familiarize themselves with the draft under discussion.
Again and again the Institute voted to approve drafts that had to
be completely revised because, on careful study, they turned out
later to be entirely impractical.24 The draftsmen and the committees
20 The names of these advisors are set out in the first part of each volume
of the Restatement, for example see RESTATEmENT, CoNRecTs ix (1932).2 1 These men are listed in the 1949 Draft, supra note 19.
22 Beutel supra note 2, 16 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 141, 142 ff (1951).
23 For example the authors of the leading works on Sales, Williston, Vold,
and Bogart are not on the committees on the Sales Article, and all of the
authorities on Commercial Paper except William E. Britten are missing from
the advisors on Article 3. Among those absent to name only a few are
Aigler, Chafee, Stephen, and Townsend. In fact the chief draftsman of this
Article was Dean William L. Prosser a well known authority on Torts with
comparatively little experience in the field of commercial paper.
24 A striking example of this is found in the case of section 1-107 of
the 1950 draft which provided that the provisions of the Code were mandatory
and could not be waived by agreement. This provision was sustained once
or twice in debate before the Institute; but after it was shown by the writer
to be impossible of application, see 16 LAw AND COMMnTu. PROB. 141, 161 if.
(1951), it disappeared from the Code.
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also adopted the practice of submitting various drafts for formal
or informal criticisms by committees of commercial agencies like
warehousemen, stock brokers, bankers, railroads, and other as-
sociations. The draftsmen then dickered with these committees or
their lawyers for changes.25 But these sessions seem to have been
informal, and so far as the writer knows there is no record of how
far what might have been an originally fair draft was eventually
twisted to serve the interest or to receive the support of particular
pressure groups. But it is clear that the absence of representatives
of consumers, labor, debtors, farmers, and bank depositors from
membership of the sponsoring bodies was also apparent in the
pressure group dealing with the draftsmen and advisory commit-
tees. The result is that the Code has been pushed far off of center
from a fair resolution of the various clashing interests involved in
various commercial transactions. The complete details of this shift
to the right will only appear after long, complicated and tedious
studies into the actual or possible workings of the Code, if and when
it might be adopted. However, there has already appeared one strik-
ing example of the result of this alleged democratic dickering. This
is found in Article 4- Bank Deposits and Collections.
ARTICLE 4- BA x DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS IS A PIECE OF
Vicious CLASS LEGISLATION
The history of the emergence of this article in its present form
illustrates the worst features of the process by which this Code
came into being. The following material which tells the story of
how this happened is reprinted in part, with their permission, from
another article by the writer in the Yale Law Journal. The original
footnotes except those referring to sections of the Code have been
omitted.
Article 4 on Bank Collections constitutes eight per
cent of the entire Code and needs careful scrutiny both as
to its history and its substantive provisions. For a long time
the statutes and decisions on bank collections have been in
a very bad state. In the face of conflicting decisions and
statutes on almost every aspect of the subject, bankers
have been adopting the device of contracts to protect them-
selves against losses which might occur in the collection
process. These fine print provisions placed on deposit slips,
savings account books, notes and other forms used by the
bank usually provide that the transaction involved is car-
ried on in the risk of the consumer and that the bank is to
be free of any resulting liability even for its own negli-
gence. The courts have often cast a jaundiced eye upon
these agreements but the law concerning their effective-
ness has long been in a state of confusion. The Uniform
Laws Commission has from time to time struggled with
2S For a reference to this procedure see Code p. 7.
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the problem of creating a uniform bank collections code.
At one time they prepared such a statute but it failed of
approval in the Commission itself because of opposition by
the banks and their counsel. While the preliminary discus-
sion of this process was still going on in the Uniform Laws
Commission, the American Banker's Association through
its counsel drafted a law covering the bank collection pro-
cess designed to protect the banks throughout the process
of collection, throwing the loss on the customers while
giving the banks the rights of holders of due course in the
paper involved. This was dressed up under the deceiving
title of the Uniform Bank Collections Code and was sold
by the banking lobby to about nineteen legislatures meet-
ing over a period of about two years, who seemed to have
adopted it under the misapprehension that it was a product
of the Uniform Laws Commission. Thereafter, a number
of authorities in the field of banking and negotiable instru-
ments wrote articles exposing the true nature of this so-
called collections code and adoptions by the legislatures
thereafter practically ceased. [It is significant that it was
never adopted in Ohio.]
The act has been declared unconstitutional in whole or
in part by the courts of a number of states. The result is
continuing confusion. About twenty-seven states have the
common law or fragmentary adoptions on the subject, the
rest have the American Banker's Association Bank Col-
lections Code or something like it. It may be unconstitu-
tional in whole or in part. Not a very pretty picture.
The draftsman of the Commercial Code realized this
situation and set out to produce a uniform act fair to both
the bankers and the customer to remove the confusion in
this field. Mr. Leary, the original draftsman of this article,
after careful research into banking and clearing house
practices and the current machinery of collection, attempt-
ed to devise a code which would fairly state the obligation
of the banks to their customers and properly distribute
liability and risk of loss. By May of 1951 this draft had al-
most reached the final stage but it was met by opposition
in the American Banker's Association and by their counsel
and lobbyists who were constantly in attendance at the
joint meetings of the Uniform Laws Commission and the
American Law Institute. The result of the pressure was
so great that in May, 1951 it was decided to omit Article
4 on Bank Collections from the Uniform Commercial Code,
and to recommend the Code without it. Mr. Leary, with his
ideas of fairness, was thus effectively side-tracked. The re-
duced Code was then finally adopted subject only to minor
changes before the meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion in September of the same year. During the following
summer months there occurred frenzied activity on the
part of the bankers and their counsel with the result that
late in August before the fall meeting of the Commission-
ers on Uniform Laws and the American Law Institute in
connection with the American Bar Association there ap-
peared a completely revised Article 4 in fragmentary form
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which was mailed to members of the Institute and the
Commission giving them less than three weeks to examine
it before the meeting. It was then rushed through the final
joint meeting with little or no debate and was approved by
the Commissioners, the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association at the same time. It is fair to
say that the great majority of the members of these organi-
zations and those at the meeting had not even read the
complete new Article 4 and that ninety per cent of the en-
tire membership had no knowledge of its nature. Shocking
as this seems, it was the usual procedure by which the
draftsmen had been presenting the Code to the Institute
and Commissioners, only in this instance their own tech-
nique was used against them.
This new Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections
follows very closely the already discredited Am e r i c an
Banker's Association Uniform Bank Collection Code. It
even re-enacts the preference articles which have caused
that act to be held unconstitutional and which are admit-
tedly contrary to current federal legislation and not, there-
fore, applicable to National Banks.26 However, it goes
much further than the American Banker's Association Act
in that it provides that all paper deposited with the bank,
unless the contracts indicate otherwise, is left for collec-
tion 7 and is to be handled entirely at the risk of the cus-
tomer.28 The bank, on the other hand, has all the rights of
a holder in due course when it is in any danger of suffering
1oss.29 All liability of the bank for improper handling of
paper so carefully and fairly set up in the earlier drafts is
removed. 30 By a trick provision of Section 4-103 and sub-
section 4,31 the bank is not bound to follow any of the col-
lection procedures set out in the act. So long as it acts
"reasonably," it is only liable for its own lack of good faith
and due care; 32 but even due care is limited by other pro-
26 § 4-214; cf. A.B.A. code provision, Ilu. REV. STAT. c. 16a § 37 (3) (Cahill
1931), declared unconstitutional in People ex rel. Barrett, 362 M. 164, 199 N.E.
272 (1935); and Explanation of Principal Changes, August Revision (mimeo.
1951) § 4-214.
27 § 4-201: Unless a contrary intent clearly appears, a depository bank
takes an item for collection regardless of the form of indorsement or lack of
indorsement and even though credit for the item is subject to immediate with-
drawal as of right.
But see § 4-105 (a). Unless § 4-201 covers all business it is meaningless.
See Comment to § 4-201 (December Revision 1951). The A.B.A. Code was
ambiguous on this point, see Ilinois Act, supra, note 26, § 26.
28 § 4-211 (1), § 4-212.
29 § 4-209, § 4-208.
3OSee § 4-103 (August 1951 draft), Explanation of Principal Changes.
31 § 4-103 (4): The specification or approval of certain procedures by this
Article does not preclude an agreement authorized by sub-section (1), nor
constitute disapproval of other procedures which may be reasonable under
the circumstances.
32 § 4-103 (1): The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied
by general or special agreement except that no agreement can disclaim a
bank's responsibility or limit the measure of damages for its own lack of
good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care.
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visions of the Code,33 and it is not liable for the acts of any
of its agents or associate banks.34 Damages for the lack of
due care and bad faith are carefully held to the minium; 35
and any action authorized by this Article is specifically
made due care for which the bank is not liable.36
Among the more striking of the acts authorized on the
part of the bank are the following. The bank is not bound
to any notice from anybody except the person depositing
the paper and need only follow his instructions.37 The
whole concept of payment in due course is abolished.38 The
bank can pay a known thief of properly endorsed paper
without any liability and there is nothing the true owner
can do about it except bring an injunction "or supply in-
demnity deemed adequate" by the bank.39 There is grave
doubt as to whether a law suit would do the true owner
any good under the circumstances because the bank is al-
lowed to supply indorsements of customers,40 and is spe-
cifically protected against any form of notice of agency or
trust which may appear on the face of the paper or in-
dorsements.41 The bank may also change by contract any
of the rules set out in this act except the duty of due
care.42 Thus the Code appears to completely approve the
type of surreptitious waivers consistently appearing in fine
print on bank forms, in spite of the fact that many courts
have refused to enforce "contracts" of this kind. Article 4
and the definitions of contracts found in the Code give
them blanket approval.43
A careful examination of the wording of the act will
show that this Article was drafted entirely with the pur-
pose of protecting the banks so that they could carry on
their business at the risk of the customer. In most instances
they have succeeded, with the aid of their lawyers, in shift-
33 § 4-103 (3): Action or non action approved by this Article or pursuant
to a general agreement, or, in the absence of special instructions, consistent
with a banking usage, is ordinary care.
See § § 4-108, 4-202 (2), 4-203, 4-205 (2), 4-210, 4-211.
34 § 4-202 (1): A collecting bank must use ordinary care in (a) presenting
an item or sending it for presentment; and ... (3) Subject to subsection (1)
(a), a bank is not liable for the insolvency, neglect, misconduct, mistake or
default of another bank. See §§ 4-106, 4-102 (2).
3S §§ 4-103 (2), 4-202 (3), supra, note 34, 4-212 (5), 4-402, 4-403 (3),
4-404, 4-405, 4-407.
36 § 4-103 (3), supra, note 33.
37 § 4-203: Only a bank's transferor can give instructions which affect
the bank or constitute notice to it and a bank is not liable to prior parties for
any action taken pursuant to such instructions or in accordance with any
agreement with its transferor.
38 §§ 4-203, supra, note 37, 3-603.
39 § 3-603 (1).
40 § 4-205 (1).
41 § 4-205 (2).
42 § 4-103 (1), supra, note 32.
43 Ibid. And see definition of Agreement and Contract § 1-201 (3) and
(U).
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ing many of the risks of the banking business to their cus-
tomers, where fairness in bank collections would require
that the bank be the insurer of the paper which it is to col-
lect. A few examples will show the complete one-sidedness
of the Code. Although the bank is supposed to be the agent
of its customers for all paper placed in its custody by the
customer either for deposit or collection, 44 the Code sets
out specifically and in minute detail the warranties which
the customer makes to the bank by the transfer of such
paper.45 But where the bank takes proceeds of the collec-
tion process on behalf of its customer no such warranties
are required from the banker. On the contrary, it holds
such paper to be collected at the risk of the customer.46
Where the bank returns statements to the customer he
must, at his peril, examine the statements not only for ac-
curacy of signatures and alterations but also endose-
ments; and failure to turn up defects such as forgeries and
the like in endorsements within the prescribed time throws
the loss on the customer even though information of this
kind is wholly within the knowledge of the banker and be-
yond the reach of the customer.47
An extreme example of this one-sided draftsmanship
is shown in the duties and liabilities surrounding stop-pay-
ment as here codified. The customer still has the right to
stop payment if he does so in the proper form,48 but the
banker's liability for wrongfully ignoring stop payment is
carefully limited to the actual loss caused thereby.4" And
though the Code does not bother to state the customers'
rights, it specifically provides conditions under which the
bank can sue the customer when it has wrongfully ignored
a stop payment order.50 In fact, this Article is so one-sid-
edly drawn in favor of the banking interests that any bank-
er who insisted on exercising the rights given him by this
Code would probably be under suspicion by the better
business bureau.
44 § 4-201, supra, note 27.
4S § 4-207.
46 § 4-211. See § 4-212.
47 § 4-406, especially sub-section (1, c).
48 § § 4-403, 4-303.
49 § 4-103 (2). See §§ 4-402, 4-403 (3).
So § 4-407: Bank's Right to Subrogation on Improper Payment
To prevent unjust enrichment, a bank which has paid a customer's item
which it may not charge in full to his account may in an action
(a) against a prior holder who has received the payment, recover any
part thereof due to its customer or any prior party in respect of the trans-
action in which the customer of the depository bank acquired the item; and
(b) against the drawer, maker or acceptor recover any amount which
would have been due from him on the item if payment had been refused.
The bank has no right to charge the customer's account in respect of such
cause of action. The bank may bring either or both such actions but may
have only one satisfaction and any right to consequential or punitive damages
remains with the customer or holder.
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This Article is a deliberate sell-out of the American
Law Institute and the Commission of Uniform Laws to the
bank lobby in the hope of return for their support of the
rest of the Code. That this would happen was forecast in
the debate before the Institute two years ago when Mr.
Schnader in a discussion with the writer said that it would
be necessary to make certain concessions to the banking in-
terests in order to get their support for the Code. And it is
significant that Mr. Schnader was very active in pushing
the present article through the meeting of the Commis-
sioners and the Institute in September even over the ap-
parent protest of the Editor-in-Chief himself. They not only
made concessions to the bankers but delivered everything
they asked for. The banks now have a piece of class legis-
lation more favorable to their interests than the American
Banker's Association Bank Collections Code which their
lobby failed to put over on the legislatures. This one-sid-
ed piece of class legislation is now backed by the prestige
of the American Law Institute and the Commission on
Uniform Laws. Such a sell-out is beneath the dignity of
both organizations and is a tremendous blow to their pres-
tige as scientific bodies. It is doubtful if the majority of the
members would have approved this article if they had
known what they were doing; and, if they do so approve,
it raises the question whether the American Law Institute
has ceased to be a learned scientific body to become a
plush pressure group dominated by reactionary financial
interests.The existence of Article 4 alone is enough to con-
demn in its entirety the adoption of this Code.
This, then, is one concrete illustration of results which have
been obtained under this convention system of drafting statutes
by this highly un-democratic process. No number of big names or
claims of experts can replace the cold facts that in Article 4, as
well as in other portions of the Code, pressure groups have been
more effective in getting what they want from the Institute and
the Commissioners than from the legislatures. Since the original
Bank Collections Code was not adopted in Ohio, there is no reason
why this one should be.
It is, therefore, unfortunately, not safe to accept this Code
merely on the prestige of the professional organizations offering
it for adoption. Other defects of language and draftsmanship will
also appear on further study.
THE PEcUIAR AND EmRATic LANGUAGE USED IN THE CODE
The language and style of the Code raises many difficulties. In
the first place this is not a code in the sense in which the term is
normally used because it is not a unified whole. It is really a col-
lection of eight separate uncorrelated statutes with a few common
sections in the front on interpretation, application, and definition,
which are soon departed from by exceptions found later in the
various individual Articles. It has been pointed out in detail else-
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where that over one-fifth of the Code is devoted to creating new
language,51 or better, sets of languages. There may be some argu-
ment for definitions of terms and even for new ones. But why do
we need the following sort of thing? In Article 1, "Purchase in-
cludes taking by sale, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift
[of all things] or other voluntary transaction creating an interest in
property"; but "Buying" is a much narrower term and "does not
include a transfer in bulk or as security"; and in Article 8 although
"a bona fide purchaser" is a "purchaser," the elements of the act
of purchase are not synonymous with either "purchase" or "buy-
ing" as defined in Article 1.52 One may give value, "by taking de-
livery, ' 53 and a "merchant is a person ... having knowledge or
skill" or one who "employs such a person. '' 4 These are only a few
examples. As has been shown in detail elsewhere, 55 one has to
learn eight such languages before he can understand this Code.
Out of over one hundred and fifty defined terms, two-thirds
are used in different meanings in the various Articles.56 Take the
well-known legal and commercial concept of holder in due course
for example. It appears under at least five different names, among
them: "holder in due course,"57 "holders to whom a negotiable
document of title has been duly negotiated,M8 "purchaser for value
and without notice," 59 "bona fide purchaser,"60 "assignee who takes
for value," and a long string of other words not particularly perti-
nent here."- Any good code would use but one term.
The elements which go to make up this concept, value, good
faith, and notice, are also chopped into minute and contradictory
bits.6 2
Value has three meanings ranging from the rule in Clayton's
51 See Beutel, supra, note 2; Comment, Creation of Contracts Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 13 U. or PrrT. L. REv. 750 (1952); note, Letters of
Credit Under the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code: An Opportunity Missed
62 YALE L. J. 227 (1953).
52 Cf. 1-201 (32), 1-201 (9), 8-302, "Value" 8-303 (b) and (c), (c) Pro-
vides that "taking delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract of purchase"
is value. Here purchase in "contract of purchase" must be different from
"purchase" as defined in 1-201 (32), see also definition of contract 1-201 (1)
and (9), or the whole concept of "value" goes out of the window. It is pretty
well shot anyhow by the provisions of this sub-section.
537-102 (g) (iii), 9-108 (1) (c).
54 2-104 (1).
55 See Beutel, supra, note 2.
56This is spelled out in detail in Beutel, supra, note 2.
573-302, 4-104 (3), 4-209, 5-103 (3).
58 7-502 (1).
598-202 (1).
608-302
619-206 (2).
62 See Beutel, supra, note 2, 61 YAL L.J. 334, 339 ff.
[Vol. 14
1953] COMMERCIAL CODE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED 15
case, 3 considerations for contracts, 64 simple commercial credit, and
various combinations thereof. 5
Good faith also has three meanings, 0 but in Article 8 it is not
required of a "bona fide purchaser of investment securities."
67
Notice has so many definitions and variations that they defy
classification. But its combined definitions well cover over five
printed pages s in numerous sections of the Code. It seems to in-
clude "actual knowledge," 69 subjective70 and objective notice,71
old-fashioned English common law constructive notice,72 and it is
not clear that even record notice may not sneak into this concept.73
There are different kinds of notice for bankers,74 brokers, 5 mer-
chants, 76 purchasers of negotiable money paper,77 documents of
title, 8 stocks and bonds,79 and security devices, 0 to name only a
few.8 1
It should be noted that there is being discussed here only
notice as an element of holding in due course. There are also many
other kinds of necessary notice, like notice to creditors in bulk
sales8 2 and notice to purchasers of collateral.83
These are only meager examples of such statutory variations
which have been set out at length and in detail elsewhere, 4 and it
63 3-303, 4-208, 4-209.
647-102 (g) (i)
65 8-303, 9-108, 3-303, 4-209.
66 See Beutel, supra, note 2, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 341; 1-201 (19), 2-103 (b),
3-302 (b), 4-103 (1, 3 and 4), 7-501 (4), cf. 7-501.
67 8-302 cf. "notice" 8-304.
68 1-201 (25) (27), 3-304, 3-305 (2 e), 3-602, 3-206 (c), 7-501, 8-304, 8-202
(5), 8-203.
691-201 (25) (a).
701-201 (25) (c).
711-201 (25) (b), 3-304 (2) (4).
72 1-201 (25)- (27), 3-304 (2), 8-202 (8), 8-305. See also Beutel, supra, note
2, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 343.
73 8-304.
744-203.
758-304.
762-104 (3), 7-501 (4), cf. 1-201 (9).
77 3-304, 4-203.
78 7-501 (4) query if notice of any kind prevents holding in due course
here.
79 8-304, 8-305.
80 9-206 (2).
S1 The effect of notice has been discussed by the author more in detail in
the articles cited in note 2, supra. See also Beutel, Comparison of the Pro-
posed Commercial Code Article 3 and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30
NED. L. Rsv. 531, 546 (1951).
82 6-107.
83 9-302, 9-402.
84 See Beutel, supra, notes 2 and 81.
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would be tedious to repeat them here. But the point is that these
variations are cumulative and multiply like flies, because basic
terms, like those mentioned above, are used in definitions of other
terms which vary from article to article.
What would be the practical result of this kind of terminology
if it became law and applied to business? One simple example in-
volving the concept of credit as value will serve to indicate the
problems of semantics here involved. A seller in a fraudulent trans-
action conveys some goods to a buyer. He then draws a negotiable
draft on the buyer and takes it to a bank for collection with a docu-
ment of title covering the goods attached. The bank gives credit,
passes it on to a broker for credit, and the broker presents it to the
buyer who refuses to pay.
The broker is not a holder in due course of the draft; 5 but is
a holder to whom the document has been duly negotiated8 6 That
means he has no rights in the money paper except as assignee of
the bank, but has perfect "title to the goods,"8 7 that is, if the buyer
"acquiesed in " the sellers' "procurement of the document."8 8 The
bank would hold both documents free from any defenses,89 so the
broker, as an assignee of the bank, with the help of a few common
law cases not codified here"0 could probably exert rights in both
the paper and the goods.9' But if the broker preceded the bank in
chain of title, he would be in the predicament first indicated. On the
other hand if the bank gave credit on a checking account, then it too
would not be a holder in due course of the draft,9 2 but only of the
document and the goods.93 If the seller got the order bill of lading
without the buyer's acquiesence, then the buyer would have title
to the goods, but not the document.94 The document would not con-
trol the goods, which conclusion seems to be flatly contradicted
by Section 2-505 (2). Now if a warehouse receipt were involved in-
stead of a bill of lading, the buyer would have no title at all95 pro-
vided, of course, no other section of the Sales Article contradicts
Section 2-401.
This is the pretty mess resulting from a different set of rules
for each kind of paper. This example involves mainly the question
853-303.
86 7-501, 7-102 (g) (i).
87 7-502 (1) (a).
88 7-503 (1).
89 4-209, 4-208.
90 Burnes v. New Mineral Fertilizer Company, 218 Mass. 300, 105 N.. 1074
(1914); see 61 YALE L.J. 349 note 103.
91 4-209, 3-306, 3-201.
92 4-208 (a).
93 7-102 (g).
94 7-503 (1), 2-505.
95 2-401 (3).
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of value as an element of holding in due course. The same situation
exists on the elements of good faith and notice, and in many other
places.
It might be said in passing that, under Section 20 of the Uni-
form Sales Act, as adopted in Ohio the title to the draft controls
the entire transaction; the documents and title to the goods are for
security only, and the question of two types of negotiation does
not arise. The elements of holding in due course are also much
more uniform under the present acts,90 also adopted in Ohio. In the
modern world where credit is the standard method of payment for
goods and documents, it doesn't make sense to have a different rule
as to each kind of paper and a distinction between various kinds
of bank credit, credit for past bills, commercial credit, and the like.
It is not uncommon to have goods, money paper, documents of title,
and even securities involved in one transaction. Why must there
be different rules for the transfer of each kind of paper for each
party connected with the transaction depending upon whether or
not he is a banker, broker, merchant, farmer,96a or just plain John
Q. Public?
As has been shown at length elsewhere the proposed Code is
much worse in this respect than are the present uniform laws97 al-
ready adopted in Ohio; and incidentally, as already shown under
Article 4 on Bank Collections, it is usually John Q. Public who gets
the worst of it under this Code.
While still on the question of the use of language there is an-
other defect which needs to be stressed. Any one slightly acquaint-
ed with the present uniform laws will be immediately struck with
the new and shiny phraseology of the proposed Code. For some un-
explainable reason, perhaps just vanity, the draftsmen insisted up-
on using new language and new outlines of the law, even where
the Commissioners Comments say they are stating old rules and
concepts, and where no change seems to have been intended. Un-
fortunately, codes are complicated bits of law and there are always
new angles which the draftsmen could not foresee. In the case of
the older language, litigation and commercial practice will have re-
vealed its quality and usefulness. It also gradually takes meaning
in the minds of the profession and the trade. The new language no
matter how good is subject to the danger that the draftsmen may
have overlooked vital situations where the change of verbiage will
give queer results. It also suffers from the danger that it will be
misunderstood, or be taken to intend a change. In fact, the usual
96 See Beutel, supra, note 2, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 342 ff.
96a. Note that farmers cannot sell to a "Buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness," 1-201 (9).
97 Id-, 339 ff.
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prima facie presumption is that a change was intended, else why
repeal the old language and create new.
Now this Code, because of its novel language is fraught with
the maximum of this danger. Every section and article of every
current uniform law, including most of the definitions have been
rewritten in new verbiage. Where the old expressions have been
saved they are out of context and therefore subject to new in-
terpretations. This guarantees the type of judicial conflict that
followed the original adoption of the uniform statutes, 8 but in
much larger quantities. It will also insure some weird changes in
the law. Two examples will suffice.
In the illustration just given about the draft and bill of lading,
part of the weird result in the title to the goods is due to this re-
wording of settled concepts. The present uniform acts provide that
the holder in due course of a document of title gets among other
things "such title to the goods as the person to whose order they
were to be delivered by the terms of the document, had or had
ability to convey."99 And under Section 20 of the Sales Act, the
seller had only a security right, so the purchaser of the paper in
all the variations of the case just mentioned would get no more
than security. But under the proposed Code the person who re-
ceives by "due negotiations" as holder in due course, Section 7-502,
acquires thereby "(a) Title to the document and (b) Title to the
goods." With the exceptions found in Section 7-503 "A document
of title confers no rights in goods against a person who before
issuance of thb document had a legal interest in them, and who
neither delivered or intrusted them to the person procuring the
document with power of disposition or pursuant to a contract for
sale, nor acquiesced in his procurement of the document."
Now this seems to say the same thing, but it doesn't. You will
notice that the document either conveys the entire title or nothing,
depending upon whether the facts fall within or without these ex-
ceptions. There is no conveying of part title or of security rights.
If, as in the case just mentioned, where the buyer acquiesced in
the procurement of the document, the facts fall within the excep-
tions, then the holder in due course of the document gets "title to
the goods" which is a lot more than the seller had, only a security
right.100
Section 2-505 probably intended the same result as Sales Act
Section 20, but the plain meaning of the document of title provis-
98 See BmTEL's BANxAxI, NsFGoTmLE NShUEN5s LAW (7th ed. 1948) Ch.
V.
99 Sales Act 33 (a); Warehouse Receipts Act 32 (a); Bills of Lading Act
41 (a).
1002-505 (a).
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ions,10 1 which are controlling, provide otherwise. One might expect
to find this case covered in Article 9 on Secured Transactions, but
Section 9-309 says the sections just quoted control. Thus the new
language destroys the main purpose of using documents of title,
for security; but is creates a very nice windfall for bankers, financ-
ing houses, and brokers. Probably only some of the courts will
swallow it; so there will be more confusion.
One more example should be dear to the technical heart of
every teacher of bills and notes. Section 7-104 provides that "a bill
of lading or other document of title is negotiable," among other
things, if "it provides for delivery to bearer or to the order of a
named person" - "Any other document is non-negotiable." Tech-
nically that, of course, means that the very common documents
payable to a named person or bearer or to a named person or his
order are not negotiable.
Two sections later'0 2 in providing for the "Essential Terms" of
a warehouse receipt, the Code requires that the goods be deliver-
able "to bearer, or to a specified person, or to a specified person or
his order." The required negotiable warehouse receipt "to the
order of a named person" is not even provided for.
Now you may say that this is a mere quibble. Everybody knows
that instruments payable to a named person or bearer are "pay-
able to bearer" and that an instrument is "payable to the order of
a named person" whether it is payable to his order or to him or
his order and that all these forms are negotiable. But why is this
so? Because the Negotiable Instruments Law Sections 8 and 9 and
the Warehouse Receipts Act Sections 5 and 7 specifically so pro-
vide. But both these acts are expressly repealed. 10 3 Therefore, if
you are to have any negotiable warehouse receipts payable to a
named person or bearer, or to a "specified person or his order" you
will have to do it by some process of reliance upon cases supported
by repealed statutes.
Now in rebuttal it may be answered that the Section 7-104
was copied verbatim from Section 5 of the Warehouse Receipts
Act, and that there have been no such troubles under this act. The
answer is simple. The copying verbatim is true; but Section 7 of the
W.R.A. provides that a non-negotiable receipt shall be marked
"non-negotiable" and that if it is not the holder may treat it as
negotiable. This section is absent from the Code, which is a "tight"
statute. So the trade is going to have to learn the law all over or
rely upon cases based upon repealed statutes. Probably, some
courts will choose one and some the other alternative; so again,
conflict is assured.
101 7-502, 7-503.
102 7-202.
103 10-102.
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These are only two examples of thousands of unclear, unneces-
sary and unintended variations which the plain meaning of the
changed language is going to create. Courts following the plain
meaning of the proposed Code, as they should if it were enacted,
will, therefore, come into conflicts with those who follow the law
as it is now understood and probably was intended. Confusion is
inevitable, and no amount of ingenious and improper interpretation
will prevent it.
All this could have been avoided by the use of well-establish-
ed statutory language.
A third objection to this Code is that it seems to go in for
novelty, just for novelty's sake.
A good example of this, which is another iron-clad guarantee
of complete confusion, is the now infamous Section 1-105 which
created a unique doctrine of conflict of laws just for this Code. In
spite of the fact that this section has been denounced by almost
all authorities on conflicts, not directly connected with the drafting
of the Code, including Rheinstein, 04 Rabel,105 Cheatham, 106 and
an assembly of Conflict of Laws teachers, 07 and although it is not
needed at all, it still appears in all its glory in the Official Draft.
It would be redundant here to attempt to set forth all the
arguments. It is enough to note that the section as set out in the
margin'0 8 requires that the law of the forum, the Commercial Code,
104 Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in The Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& Comrmn. PROB. 114, 115 (1951); id. Book Review, 26 IND. L. Rsv. 576, 581
(1951).
105 Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. OF CH.
L. Rsv. 427, 428 (1950).
10 6 See Rheinstein, supra, note 104, 16 LAw & CONTE Mp. PROB. 114, 115.
107 Id.
108 Section 1-105. Applicability of the Act; Parties' Right to Choose Ap-
plicable Law.
(1) Article 1 applied to any contract or transaction to which any other
Article of this Act applies.
(2) The articles on Sales (Article 2), Documentary Letters of Credit
(Article 5) and Documents of Title (Article 7) apply whenever any contract
or transaction within the terms of any one of the Articles is made or occurs
after the effective date of this Act and the contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within this
state; or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
(c) relates to or involves goods which are to be or are in fact delivered,
shipped or received within this state; or
(d) involves a bill of lading, warehouse receipt or other document of
title which is to be or is in fact issued, delivered, sent or received
within this state; or
(e) is an application or agreement for a credit made, sent or received
within this state, or involves a credit issued in this state or under
which drafts are to be presented in this state or confirmation or ad-
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shall apply to any commercial transactions that any way touches
the state of the forum. Since a large proportion of important com-
mercial transactions are either interstate or international, this
would require a court of the forum to apply its own law to all as-
pects of such transactions. In suits involving international trade
foreign law would be wiped out. In domestic interstate trade no
lawyer could advise his client because he could not anticipate which
state the transaction might touch, or where his opponent might
decide to sue. It needs no citation of authorities to show what this
provision would do to the established rules of conflicts as laid down
by the courts of Ohio.
Until the Code is uniformly adopted, which is likely to never
happen, or at best will take twenty-five to fifty years, confusion
is assured. We have been told that as soon as the Code becomes
uniformly adopted this difficulty will disappear. This overlooks the
fact that, with the other possibilities of conflicting decisions already
mentioned and yet to be mentioned, there would continue to be a
gigantic problem of choice of law. It should also be noted that the
Code itself in many places preserves the conflicting state laws; for
example, liability for negligence in Sections 7-204 and 7-309. There
are many others. 09
vice of which is sent or received within this state, or involves any
negotiation within this state of a draft drawn under a credit.
(3) The Articles on Commercial Paper (Article 3) and Bank Deposits
and Collections (Article 4) apply whenever any contract or transaction within
the terms of either of the Articles is made or occurs after the effective date
of this Act and the contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within this
state; or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
(c) involves commercial paper which is made, drawn or transferred with-
in this state.
(4) The Article on Investment Securities (Article 8) applies whenever
any contract or transaction within its terms is made or occurs after the effec-
tive date of this Act and the contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or occurs within this state; or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
(c) involves an investment security issued or transferred within this state.
But the validity of a corporate security shall be governed by the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation.
(5) The Articles on Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Secured Transactions
(Article 9) apply whenever any contract or transaction within their terms is
made or occurs after the effective date of this Act and falls within the pro-
visions of Section 6-102 or Sections 9-102 and 9-103.
(6) Whenever a contract, instrument, document, security or transaction
bears a reasonable relationship to one or more states or nations in addition
to this state the parties may agree that the law of any such other state or
nation shall govern their rights and duties. In the absence of an agreement
which meets the requirements of this subsection, this Act governs.
109 For example see 6-106 Bulk Sales, 9-102, 3-121.
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The Code itself also provides for exception from this rule for
the benefit of banks,110 security debtors,' and others.112 It also
provides that the section can be contracted away by the parties. 3
Professor Gilmore"1 4 has suggested that this removes the objections.
If this be sound, then there is no use of arguing about the merits
of the Code because most of it also can be contracted away,115 all
of which puts a great premium upon sophistication and gives undue
advantages to businesses able to hire council in advance of every
transaction. A good code should minimize, not increase this in-
equality.
A fourth and very important objection to this Code is that it
is fragmentary. Any good code is couched in general language in-
tended to cover all cases. This collection of statutes goes into minute
details about single situations covering only fragments of the law.
Look at the Commissioners Comment 16 to Section 9-102, and you
will find an index to special rules found in that one article. The
index alone covers three pages.
Let us examine one example of the effect of failing to codify
general law. Section 59 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states
a simple general principle as follows: "Every holder is deemed
prima facie to be a holder in due course." Now the cross references
in the front of the Code refer to four sections which are supposed
to state this rule 3-207, 3-306, 3-307, and 8-301; 3-207 has to do
with the effect of negotiation by infants, etc., 3-306 the rights of
one not a holder in due course, 3-307 covers the burden of estab-
lishing signatures, 117 and 8-301 covers the rights acquired by a
bona fide purchaser of a security. None states the general principle.
Now it should be noted that the principle as stated by the Negoti-
able Instruments Law, Section 59, should apply to all negotiable
paper, money paper, documents of title, and securities. Yet the
cross references in the first of the Code show no such section, and
after fairly diligent search it has not been discovered. If it were
found, it would have to be repeated at least three times because the
general principles of negotiation are nowhere set out; but each
type of negotiable paper has its own little separate article. It might
have been placed in Article 1, but was not.118 Now even with
110 4-102 (7).
111 9-103.
1121-105 (6).
113 1-105 (6).
114 Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code, A Reply to Professor Beutel,
61 YAmx L.J. 364, 373 (1952).
11s 1-102 (b).
116 Code p. 693-696.
117 For money paper the general principle of N.I.L. 59 might be reached
by a backhanded interpretation of 3-201 (3).
118 Cf 1-202 on authenticity of documents.
[Vol. 14
1953] COMMERCIAL CODE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED 23
Negotiable Instruments Law Section 59 on the books some courts
have gone wrong on the proposition that a holder is prima facie
the owner.119 What will happen when this section is repealed and
there is none to replace it?
The same is true of N.I.L. 24. "Every instrument is deemed
prima facie to have been issued for consideration.' 20
All this and much more is well known general law, perhaps
so well known that the draftsmen did not bother to put it down in
the special statutes which they were constructing; but this is well
known law not by virtue of the common law, but because of uni-
form statutes which this Code expressly repeals. Where are these
and many similar general principles121 to come from after repeal?
Here again confusion is guaranteed by adoption of this Code.
This leads us to another major objection to this Code. It is bas-
ed upon a peculiar realistic idea of the nature of law, that what the
officials do and not the statutes is the law.122 For example, Sections
7-204 and 7-309 provide for a standard of care on the part of ware-
housemen and carriers on issuing documents of title. They are
somewhat complicated and far too long to reproduce here. But at
the end of the sections it is provided that "This section does not
repeal or change any existing rule of law which imposes a higher
or different responsibility or invalidates contractual limitations
which would be permissible under this Article." Now both the
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform Bill of Lading
Act Sections 3 (b) impose both "higher" and "different" liabilities
upon carriers and warehousemen; but the cases under these acts
are split as to their result.12 3 These acts are also repealed in their
entirety by Section 10-102 of this Code. What is the "rule of law"
that the Code is talking about? If it is the old uniform statutes
they are repealed unless this particular section is taken to contra-
dict the general repeal, in which case they are not repealed; but
then they would contradict the plain words of the sections. If this
was meant to be the law why did not the Code use the old uniform
119 Standard v. Orleans Flour Co., 93 Neb. 389, 140 N.W. 636 (1913);
Eichinger v. Zimmerman, 243 N.Y. Supp. 155, 230 App. Div. 708 (1930); The
Masonic Temple Craft v. Stauss, 152 Neb. 604, 42 N.W. (2d) 178 (1950);
contra: BEuTI's BRANmtx, NECnABLLE INsTau ummS LAw (7th ed. 1948) 859 ff.
120 3-408 covers antecedent debts only.
121 For example N.LL. 16 Conclusive presumption of delivery to Holder
in due course, N.LL. 46, place of indorsement
122 See Liewellyn, Bramble Bush (1951) p. 13 ff. The author has changed
his position in theory, see id. p. 8, but it still appears in practice throughout
the code as indicated here.
123 Central Storage Warehouse Co. v. Pickening, 114 Ohio St. 76, 151 N..
39 (1926); contra: Healy v. New York Central, 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N.Y.
Supp. 237 (1912) and cases cited Beutel, U-iFoPm CommciAL LAws (1950)
228-245.
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sections in question with such amendments as would remove the
judicial conflict? That would be too simple! Probably what is meant
by "rule of law" is the court decision in the various states just
mentioned, unsupported by the repealed statutes upon which they
are based. A pretty mess, but in accordance with the original juri-
dical doctrine of realism.
As has been pointed out at length elsewhere 2 4 the Code is full
of this sort of thing, being drafted on the theory that there is a
common law or some kind of "law" outside the Code which will
settle fundamental questions. No such general common law ever
existed,125 and the repealed statutes have been the basis of any
other law for about fifty years. It is true that in each state there
were decisions and common law before the adoption of the Uni-
form Statutes. As, for example, the pre-statutory Common Law of
Ohio, which could form the background to fill the hiatus created
by the repeal of the uniform statutes and the silence of the new
Code. Disregarding the fact that many of the older Ohio decisions
themselves rested upon repealed statutes and assuming that a local
state common law could come to the rescue of the Code, each state
would necessarily furnish its own background of common law, and
the old confusion which existed before the enactment of the uni-
form laws would again be revived. The national adoption of the
Code then would be more likely to result in chaos than uniformity.
A fifth and fundamental objection to the proposed Code is its
unusual style. It is a characteristic of codes that they are couched
in simple general language. If one will examine the Negotiable
Instruments Law, the Sales Act, most of the uniform commercial
statutes, and the other codes of the world, he will find that they
consist mostly of short, concise sections in terse sentences. This
Code, however, has long and complicated sections, often incorpor-
ating by reference whole sections as exceptions, in sentences that
are a half page or more long. Just thumb through Article 9, and
this will at once become apparent.
Section 9-312, set out in the margin,126 which purports to state
124 See Beutel, supra, note 2, 16 LAW & CoN=Bi '. PR0B. 141, 154 ff.
125 See BEurEL's BRANAnh, N EaOrAB INsTRum s LAW (7th ed. 1948) Chs.
I-u.
126 Section 9-312. Conflicting Security Interests: General Rules of Priority.
When conflicting security interests attach to the same collateral, such in-
terests rank in the order of time of perfection with the following exceptions:
(1) An interest which attaches after filing takes priority from the time
of filing, but in case of conflict this rule is subject to the rules stated in the
following subsections.
(2) A secured party who has a perfected security interest and who makes
later advances to the debtor on the same collateral and under the same se-
curity agreement takes priority as to the later advances from the time when
his security interest was originally perfected.
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general rules of priorities of conflicting security interests, is one
of the worst examples of this sort of thing. In the original it is a
page and a half long, divided into eight sub-sections, seven of
which are exceptions to the first, which, in turn, is an exception
to the rule stated. Many of the sub-sections are exceptions within
exceptions to each other, and the last incorporates three other
sections covering two and a half pages, which "supplement" what-
ever that means, "the rules stated in this section." It seems im-
possible to tell what it means, and there is doubt whether a logician
or a grammarian could diagram it. All this seems unnecessary.
Since they were creating a code, all they had to do was to state
(3) A secured party who has a perfected security interest and who ac-
quires rights in after-acquired collateral under a term in the security agree-
ment takes priority as to such rights from the time when his security interest
was originally perfected, whether or not he makes advances on the after-
acquired collateral, except as otherwise provided in subsection (4).
(4) A purchase money security interest has priority over a conflicting
interest in the same collateral which is claimed under an after-acquired prop-
erty clause if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time
the debtor receives the collateral or within ten days thereafter and, where the
collateral is inventory, if before the debtor receives it the purchase money
party also notifies any secured party who has made a prior filing covering in-
ventory of the type concerned. Such notification must describe the inventory
concerned, state that the interest is a purchase money security interest and
specify its amount. If, however, the interest claimed under an after-acquired
property clause is itself a purchase money security interest, the rule stated
in subsection (5) applies.
(5) When there are conflicting purchase money security interests, the
interest of a seller or of a secured party whose advance was used at his di-
rection to pay a seller takes priority if he has perfected his interest at the
time the debtor receives the collateral or within ten days thereafter. In any
other case of conflicting purchase money security interests they rank equally.
(6) When the collateral is crops the interest of a later secured party who,
in order to enable the debtor to produce them, makes a new advance, incurs
a new obligation, releases a perfected security interest or gives other new
value during the production season or not more than three months before the
crops are planted or otherwise become growing crops, takes priority over
the interest of an earlier secured party to the extent that the earlier interest
secured obligations (such as rent, interest or mortgage principal amortization)
due more than six months before the crops are planted or otherwise become
growing crops.
(7) A security interest which secures an obligation to reimburse a surety
or other person secondarily obligated to complete performance is subordinate
to a later security interest given to a secured party who makes a new ad-
vance, incurs a new obligation, releases a perfected security interest or gives
other new value to enable the debtor to perform the obligation for which the
earlier secured party is liable.
(8) Section 9-313 on goods which are part of the realty, Section 9-314
on goods which are affixed to other goods and Section 9-315 on goods which
are commingled or processed state rules of priority which supplement the
rules stated in this section.
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"Conflicting Security Interests shall take priority in the following
order" and then list them.
Section 3-304 on notice to purchasers of money paper is an-
other beauty; but this has been spelled out at length elsewhere 12 7
and there is no need to reproduce it here. There are many others
of this ilk.128
Another example of this obscure and technically bad drafts-
manship is found in Section 9-206. There has long been a conflict
as to the negotiability of chattel notes, that is, notes otherwise
negotiable containing a security agreement. 12 9 There has also been
a conflict as to the effect of transfer of negotiable paper with col-
lateral security agreements like mortgages, conditional sales, bail-
ment leases, and the like. Some courts have held that the subsidiary
contract was negotiable with the note, 13 0 others that the subsidiary
contract being non-negotiable the note was likewise so,131 and some
that the note passed by negotiation and the subsidiary contract by
assignment.132 To meet this difficulty many lawyers have created
the device of negotiability by contract which has been discussed
at length elsewhere, and upon the effect of which the courts are
also split.1 33 Here was an excellent opportunity for the draftsmen
to clear up the law. What have they done about it? Enacted Section
9-206, set out in the margin, 134 with the rule that in the case of
127 Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Comvmercial Code, Article 3 and
the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REv. (1951) 531, 546 ff.
1 28 For example see, 1-105, 2-401, 3-501, 4-207, 7-210, 7-308, 7-403, 8-202.
129 The discussion goes back to the Ames Brewster Controversy. For a
collection of authorities see Beutel, Uxioinz ComumcrAL LAws (1950) 219 ff.13 0 For authorities supporting this view see, 2 JoNEs, MOIRGAGEs (8th ed.
1928) §§ 1057 if, 1063 ff; Britton, Assignments of Mortgages Securing Negotiable
Notes, 10 I.., L. REv. 337 (1915).
131 State National Bank of El Paso, Texas v. J. H. Contrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143
P. 2d 592 (1943); see note 152 A.L.R. 1222 (1944).
132 See Note, 29 NEB. L. R-v. 606 (1950).
133 See Beutel, Negotiability by Contract, 28 ILL. L. Rzv. 205 (1933).
134Section 9-206. Agreement Not to Assert Defenses Against Assignee;
Modification of Sales Warranties by Security Agreement.
(1) An agreement by a buyer of consumer goods as part of the contract
for sale that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense arising
out of the sale is not enforceable by any person. If such a buyer as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
even a holder in due course of the negotiable instrument is subject to such
claims or defenses if he seeks to enforce the security interest either by pro-
ceeding under the security agreement or by attaching or levying upon the
goods in an action upon the instrument.
(2) In all other cases an agreement by a buyer that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense arising out of the sale is enforceable
by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be
asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one trans-
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"consumer goods" (a concept which itself is not clear in the defi-
nition, Section 9-109) even a negotiable note secured by such goods
is not negotiable if the holder attempts to enforce the security or
levy on the goods. If he does not so levy, the note apparently is
negotiable. (A nice trap for the unsophisticated, making the sub-
stantive right depend upon the choice of procedural remedy.) But
in all other cases where negotiability by contract or a negotiable
note is involved, the buyer will have been presumed to have signed
a contract waiving defenses. On just what is the effect of the pre-
sumed waiver, and whether the security contract passes by negoti-
ation, assignment, estoppel by contract, etc., the section is silent.
In this, one of the commoner business transactions, it will take
about fifty years of litigation to tell what this section means; con-
flicting decisions are assured in advance. It could all have been set-
tled by providing that when a non-negotiable contract secures a ne-
gotiable note, both pass by negotiation, or better, that the note pass-
es by negotiation and the contract by assignment.
This was suggested to the draftsmen at a conference of experts
about six years ago; like many suggestions for improvements in
these drafts, it fell on deaf ears. There is no excuse for this sort
of thing, but the Code is still full of it.
AETICLE 9 IS TOO EXPERIMENTAL AND TOO CRUDE
In theory Article 9 on Secured Transactions is an attempt to
consolidate all security transactions to one system of law and to
provide for a recording system to protect lenders and bona fide
purchasers of the property given as security. It not only is intended
to replace the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Chattel Mortgage
Acts, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, but also it attempts to
govern any sort of commercial transaction which results in a lien
on or pledge of goods, accounts, or commercial paper. It is obvious-
ly a grandiose experiment in attempting to codify the law govern-
ing all of the various commercial security transactions. In the words
of the draftsman
Article 9 deliberately cuts loose from all anchorage
in the past. It cuts across what have been regarded as sepa-
rate fields of law, introducing a completely new termin-
ology, incidentally repeals much old law, and in the pro-
cess creates, and attempts to solve, new problems of its
own. 135
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes
such an agreement.
(3) When a seller retains a purchase money security interest in goods the
sale is governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2) and a security agreement
cannot limit or modify warranties made in the original contract of sale.
13S Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
16 LAw & CoNTrrs. PROB. 27, 28 (1951). Confirming this statement Comment
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No economic data is offered to show that such sweeping
changes in the law are necessary and there seems to be little if any
research to indicate that the particular rules of law suggested here
would be better than any of hundreds of others that might be used.
To urge the adoption of such a new and untried statute is a rash
shot in the dark to say the least.
As already indicated by many examples in this and other dis-
cussions, Article 9 is not well drafted. The many intricate changes
in the law which it attempts raise problems of interpretation of
gigantic scope. Already almost as much has been written about this
Article as the rest of the Code combined1 36 and still its concepts
are hazy, its language complicated and obscure, and its impact upon
the business world scarcely considered.
One example in addition to those already given will suffice
to show the perils involved in adopting this kind of statute. Section
9-109, set out in the margin,13 7 divides goods into four classifica-
No. 2, to Section 9-105, Code p. 708 says:
"2. 'Debtor' (subsection (1) (d): the terms 'debtor' and 'secured party'
(subsection (1) (i)), which are used in this Article to describe the parties
to a security transaction, have been chosen in a deliberate effort to break
away from existing terminology.
This Article abandons distinctions based on the form of the various se-
curity devices (see Comment to Section 9-101) and refers generally to 'se-
curity interests' (defined in Section 1-201). It is necessary to have a set of
terms to describe the parties to a security transaction, but the selection of
the set of terms applicable to any one of the existing forms (for example,
mortgagor and mortgagee) might carry to some extent the implication that
the existing law referable to that form was to be used for the construction
and interpretation of this Article. Since it is desired to avoid any such im-
plication, a set of terms having no common law or statutory roots has been
chosen."
136 Article 9 has been discussed, among others, in the following articles:
Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HAnV. L. REv. 588
(1949); Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CoNTmw.
PROB. 687 (1948); Ireton, The Proposed Commercial Code: A New Deal in
Chattel Security, 43 ILL. L. REv. 794 (1949); Kripke, The "Secured Transac-
tions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REV. 577 (1949);
Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 59 YALm L. J. 1209 (1950); Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article-of
the Commercial Code, Everett, Securing Security, Countryman, The Secured
Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act, all in 16 LAw & CoNmoip. PNoB. 27, 49 and 76 (1951). All of 13 LAw &
CoNTErm. PO. 553-702 (1948) was devoted to the problem; Brindbaum Article
9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, [1952] WiscoNsDn L. REV.
348; note id 730.
137 Section 9-109. Classification of Goods: "Consumer Goods"; "Equip-
ment"; "Farm Products"; "Inventory."
Goods are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for
personal, family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business
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tions- "consumers' goods," "farm products," "inventory," and
"equipment." The latter seems to be a catch-all for goods not
found in the other three classifications. All of these terms are highly
technical and most af them are not used in the ordinary sense in
which they are understood in commerce and trade. Yet this classifi-
cation becomes the basis of later determining the conflicting rights
of purchasers and debtors, the nature of rights and actions to be
taken on default and the determination for the place of filing. 3 8
In regard to this latter alone it should be noted that there are at
least six different places and one alternative provision provided
for filing, 39 and the debtor must choose the right place to file at
the peril of failing to perfect his rights' 40 or losing them to subse-
quent purchasers or other creditors 41 Now it should be noted
that the definitions of the various classes of goods seem to depend
upon the intention of the debtor in dealing with them. For example,
if a farmer wants to borrow money on grain stored on his farm,
the grain seems to be "farm products," if he intends to feed it to
his stock; "inventory," if he intends to sell' 42 or re-sell it; "con-
sumers' goods," if he intends to grind and use it for personal or
family use; and apparently "equipment" if he bought it from a
neighbor and is just holding it, not having yet made up his mind
what he intends to do with it.
The creditor will either have to know or guess the farmer's
intention before he can choose the proper recording office.' 43 Now
if the farmer has multiple intentions on a bin full of fungible goods
or may change his mind about their disposition, the only thing a
lawyer could advise his client, the creditor, would be to record
in every available place. The average creditor who relies upon the
(including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit or-
ganization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not
included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;
(3) "farm products" if they pre crops or livestock used or produced in
farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their un-
manufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk
and eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor from whose raising,
fattening, grazing or other farming operations they derive or in which they
are used. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor in-
ventory;
(4) "inventory" if they are held or are being prepared for sale or are to
be furnished under a contract of service or if they are raw materials, work
in process or materials used or consumed in a business. If goods are inven-
tory they are neither farm products nor equipment.
13 8 See Comment 1 to 9-109.
139 9-401.
140 9-302.
141 9-301.
142 Cf. contra: Comment 4, Code p. 718.
143 See 9-401.
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normal commercial use of the terms will immediately be in hot
water. It should be also noticed that when Article 9-401 signifying
the places of recording is examined there appears a fifth category
into which goods are divided, namely, "crops," which does not
seem to be defined. Perhaps an ordinary banker, lender, or other
businessman would assume that a loan on corn in storage might be
a lien on a crop,144 which under Section 9-401 would have to be
recorded "in the county where the land... is located." But the
discussion above would show that a court might hold how wrong
he would be. But the rightness or wrongness of the interpretation
is not important, it is a pity that it is necessary at all In fact the
Comment to Section 9-109 suggests that these are lines "for the
courts to draw."'1 45 So it seems that if you record under this act
you may get a law suit, and if you don't you are almost sure to lose
your lien. Not a happy condition for a recording act, especially
when it could be easily avoided by requiring all types of liens to be
registered in one place. This one example is sufficient to show the
difficultfes certain to accompany such a sweeping change of the
law as is contemplated by Article 9.
Now the writer is hardly one to object to experimentation,'"
but at the same time it seems wise that changes of as radical a
nature as those requireil by this Article should be enacted and
observed on a small scale. Then the law should be re-written before
it is offered for national adoption by the forty-eight states.
If the legislature of Ohio wants to indulge in such experimen-
tation, it might adopt Article 9 as a separate statute and then, after
five or ten years' observation of its results, decide what it wants
to do about the rest of the Code. But even such a step would
not seem wise as long as Article 9 remains in its present form.
CONCLUSION
As has been indicated above Articles 4 and 9 of the proposed
Code in their present form are entirely unacceptable and should
not be adopted either as separate statutes or as part of a unified
commercial code. The rest of the Code, although it makes no radical
changes in the substantive law, is drafted in such unique and un-
usual terminology that to adopt it would require a complete
judicial reinterpretation of the law.147 Any state, therefore, which
144 So also The New Standard Dictionary (1946).
145 Comment 4 to 9-109 Code p. 718.
146 See Beutel, An Outline of the Nature and Method.9 of Experimental
Jurisprudence, 51 CoL. L. REv. 415 (1951).147 Lest someone might argue that since the chief detailed specific ob-
jections in this paper are to Articles 4 and 9 that therefore the rest of the
Code is above or beyond criticism, the diligent reader is referred to my three
other articles on the subject cited supra, notes 2 and 81 where I have set out
at length many more specific objections to other Articles of the Code, not
only my own but those of many learned authorities not cited here.
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adopts this Code in its present form will destroy the uniformity
which has been built up slowly and carefully over fifty years of
successive adoption of the commercial laws. If one important state
makes such an adoption, there could never be any hope of estab-
lishing uniformity again except by repeal of the Code and re-en-
actment of the uniform statutes in the adopting state or, perhaps,
by enactment of the Commercial Code in all the other states. If
past experience is any indication of the expectation of such adop-
tion, it would probably take fifty to one hundred years to get uni-
form enactment of this new Code.
If there were any grave defects in the present uniformly adop-
ted statutes, or, if there were a crisis in the commercial law, such
drastic steps might be necessary, but no such condition seems to
obtain. A commercial code, adopting the present standard termin-
ology with such changes in language as experience has shown to
be necessary and such additions as careful study might indicate
would be advisable, could be drafted.
The adoption of such a code by any one state would not run
the danger of dislocating of the law and creating conflicting de-
cisions destroying uniformity which is involved in this draft. It
would, therefore, be wise for the legislature of Ohio, and any other
state legislature, to refrain from adopting this Code until it has
been returned to the Institute and been put in a more practical
form. If the legislature so desires it could adopt portions of this
Code as experimental statutes, but to adopt the whole would be
to invite chaos in the Commercial Law.
